between Bouchavesnes and the Roye road. The constitution of my available troops in view of the various eventualities that may present themselves is really a vital question which I desire to solve without any delay.

Cordially yours,

NIVELLE."

Both the French and the British Armies were to conduct an offensive more or less on the old lines, each on its own front. But a formidable " mass of manoeuvre " was to be constituted behind the French Front, and after the two armies had started their attacks, this mass was without warning to be flung suddenly on the enemy on another part of the French Front.

It will be observed that in its general character it differed fundamentally from the Chantilly scheme.

Its success depended on the suddenness of the attack and on misleading the enemy as to the *Minor part* sector where the main effort was to be *BritSi Army* expected. In no respect was the change more apparent than in the role which it assigned to the British Army. To this change more than to any other is attributable the hostility of Sir Douglas Haig. In the Chantilly scheme the main burden of the attack fell upon the British, and Sir Douglas Haig would have played the leading part in the projected offensive. By the Nivelle scheme the French were to bear practically the main burden of the attack, and the part assigned to the British Army

was first of all to take over a part of the French line so as to release troops for the attacking force ; and to hold the Germans down on their own front by a subordinate offensive, so as to make it impossible for